Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.

DEFINITIONS

I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv. Cor.)

II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,

which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).

V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.

I. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.

VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.

AXIOMS

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist.

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought.

PROPOSITIONS

I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

(Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence)

II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.). Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.

VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

<<<<

****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.

III. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

<<<

IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being (forma) of man.

XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

<<<<

XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.

XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.

XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.

XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.

XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected.

XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.

XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.

XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.

XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

XXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false.

XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.

XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.

XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.

XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.

XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.

XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.

<<<<

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.