II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be.
III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas.
IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself.
V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.
VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being.
VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.
VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.
X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.
XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things.
XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two, be also affected by the other.
XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.
XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.
XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it.
XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.
XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.
XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure.
XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.
XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.
XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel love towards him.
XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.
XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus).
XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.
XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.
XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.
XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.
XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency.
XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.
XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.
XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him.
XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return.
XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return. (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.)
XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.
XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.
XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.
XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.
XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.
XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.
LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.
LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself.
LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity.
LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.
LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.
(It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy.)
<<<< LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion
compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual,
only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
(All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above
given show. But desire is each man's nature or essence.) LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other
emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we
are active. LIX. No painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its
being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which are
attributable to the mind in that condition. DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS I. "Desire" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. II. "Pleasure" is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection. III. "Pain" is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection. I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, and desire.
IV. "Wonder" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind
comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other
concepts. VI. "Love" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. ^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love;
the definition given by those authors who say that love is "the lover's wish to unite
himself to the loved object" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to
acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands
admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a
property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do
not here mean by "wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind
(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of
being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when
it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
"wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence
of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least
maintained. VII. "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. X. "Devotion" is love towards one whom we admire. XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a
quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate. XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something
past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue. XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or
future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note). IV. "Confidence" is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or
future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed. XV. "Despair" is pain arising from the idea of something past or future,
wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed. XVI. "Joy" is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has
had an issue beyond our hope. XVII. "Disappointment" is pain accompanied by the idea of something past,
which has had an issue contrary to our hope. XVIII. "Pity" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen
someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii.
note). ^^^^^Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there seems to be no
difference. XIX. "Approval" is love towards one who has done good to another. XX. "Indignation" is hatred towards one who has done evil to another. XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we
bear him. XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by
another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune. XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to
feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune. XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of
himself and his own power of action. XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own
weakness of body or mind. ^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean
pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action. XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we
believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind. XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love. XXIX. "Self-abasement" is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of
pain. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind
affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis)
greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think
of one thing rather than another. And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II. xi., xiii.), that it
affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection
the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less
perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part thereof,
something involving more or less reality than before. When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished, I
merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea
involving more or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body.
For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by the
excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added "by the presence of which the mind is
determined to think of one thing rather than another," so that, besides the nature of
pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express
the nature of desire.