INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF MIND Warning: include(/includes/insert0.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 11 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert0.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 11 <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="shawn mikula, theory, theories, dynamic core hypothesis, consciousness resources, consciousness journals, Searle, Dennett, Edelman, brains, mind/brain, mind, brain, brain science, fmri, mri"> <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Shawn Mikula's Expansion of Consciousness Page"> Warning: include(/includes/insert1.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 24 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert1.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 24 Introduction to Theories of Mind Warning: include(/includes/insert2.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 34 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert2.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 34 Warning: include(/includes/insert_mind.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 37 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert_mind.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 37  <center> <hr width=50%><big> Introduction to Theories of Mind </big> <hr width=50%> </center> <h1> Introduction</h1> <h2> Minds as Souls: Mental Substances</h2> <ul> <li> Mind & mentality:</li> <ul> <li> a basic "natural" distinction between haves & nots</li> <li> like between living & not</li> <li> male & female</li> </ul> <li> Differences of attitude</li> <ul> <li> towards sentient things</li> <ul> <li> things possessed of sensations or feelings</li> <li> owed some measure of concern or nonabuse on that accord</li> </ul> <li> towards intelligent things</li> <ul> <li> things possessed of reasoning abilities</li> <li> owed some measure of respect on that accord</li> <li> owe some measure of respect & concern on that accord</li> </ul> </ul> <li> The higher on the scale of intelligence the more psychological characterization gets a useful grip</li> <ul> <li> sensations: pleasure, pain, itches, sensory experiences</li> <li> emotions: anger, fear, frustration, love</li> <li> perception: seeing, hearing, etc.</li> <li> memory</li> <li> learning</li> </ul> <li> Rheostat (dimmer switch) comparision</li> <ul> <li> Question 1: is there an off point?</li> <ul> <li> Question 1a: If so, where is it?</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Mental Properties, Events, and Processes</h2> <ul> <li> Minds as souls</li> <ul> <li> our very selves</li> <li> possibly immortal</li> </ul> <li> Soul as life-force, the motivating form of a living body (Aristotle)</li> <ul> <li> vegetative: plants live</li> <li> animative/sensitive: animals move and sense</li> <li> rational: humans think, exercising intelligence or reason</li> <li> incapable of disembodied existence</li> </ul> <li> Soul as immaterial intellect</li> <ul> <li> Plato</li> <ul> <li> simple, divine, and immutable (unlike bodies)</li> <li> capable of independent existence</li> <ul> <li> before birth: learning is remembrance</li> <li> as well as after: survival</li> </ul> <li> argument for the indestructibility of souls (Phaedo)</li> <ul> <li> souls are simple (not having parts)</li> <li> destruction is decomposition (coming apart)</li> <li> therefore, souls are indestructible</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Descartes: "I am, then, in the strict sense, only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason."</li> </ul> <li> Cartesian Substance Dualism</li> <ul> <li> Substance v. Attribute</li> <ul> <li> Every attribute or feature (smiling, standing, being red) is necessarily an attribute of some substantial thing (e.g., a face, a cat, a fire hydrant).</li> <ul> <li> accidents: features that the thing can either have or lack (e.g., smiling, standing)</li> <li> essences: features that the thing must have to make it the (kind of) thing it is</li> <ul> <li> e.g., for a table</li> <ul> <li> its color is an accident</li> <li> its having a top is essential</li> </ul> <li> e.g., for a person:</li> <ul> <li> accidents: smiling, standing, being tan</li> <li> essence: rationality, sensitivity, life</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Descartes: Two kinds of substances & their essences</li> <ul> <li> matter: spatial extension</li> <li> mind: thinking or consciousness</li> </ul> <li> Interaction problem</li> <ul> <li> Interactionist Dualism</li> <ul> <li> body -> body causation: the sunlight causes electro-chemical changes in my retina</li> <li> body -> mind causation: my retina goes on and I see the light</li> <li> mind -> mind causation: I see the light and think "UV radiation causes cataracts"</li> <li> mind -> body causation: I think "UV radiation causes cataracts" and reach for my sunglasses</li> </ul> <li> Trouble about mind <-> body causation: where the twain shall meet</li> <ul> <li> thoughts are in consciousness, not in space</li> <li> bodies are in space, not in consciousness</li> </ul> <li> Aggravating observation: the intimacy of the mind-body connection as we know it</li> <ul> <li> "I am not in my body like the pilot of a vessel"</li> <li> but am "intimately conjoined" with it: feeling hungry is unlike seeing the gas gauge on E</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Philosophy of Mind</h2> <ul> <li> Three issues</li> <ul> <li> What are minds or what constitutes mentality?</li> <li> How are various mental phenomena related?</li> <li> How are mental and physical phenomena related?</li> <ul> <li> How could mental phenomena have physical effects?: Causal Closure.</li> <li> Why should physical phenomena have mental effects?: Explanatory Gap.</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Additional issue: what things think (or have mentality)?</li> <ul> <li> humans</li> <li> (which) other organisms?</li> <li> computers?</li> <li> collectives?</li> </ul> </ul> <h2> Supervenience, Dependence, and Minimal Physicalism</h2> <ul> <li> Three principles</li> <ul> <li> Mind-body supervenience</li> <ul> <li> No difference without a physical difference.</li> <li> ". . . any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental properties. That is physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility." (10)</li> </ul> <li> Anti-Cartesianism</li> <ul> <li> No immaterial substances.</li> <li> "There can be no purely mental beings (for example, Cartesian souls). That is, nothing can have a mental property without having some physical property and hence without being a physical thing." (11)</li> </ul> <li> Mind-body dependence</li> <ul> <li> The physical is more basic than (and explains) the mental.</li> <li> "What mental properties a given thing has depends on, and is determined by, what physical properties it has. That is to say, the psychological character of a thing is wholly determined by its physical character." (11)</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Varieties of physicalism</li> <ul> <li> minimal physicalism</li> <ul> <li> defined by these three principles</li> <li> affirms the complete & assymetric dependence of the mental on the physical</li> </ul> <li> reductive physicalism:</li> <ul> <li> beyond superveniece & dependence: mental phenomena are physical</li> <ul> <li> pain = C-fiber activation</li> <li> visual experiences = 40hz ocillations in the visual cortex</li> </ul> <li> identifies types of mental phenomena with types of physical phenomena</li> </ul> <li> eliminative physicalism: denies the existence of the mental</li> </ul> </ul> <h2> Varieties of Mental Phenomena</h2> <ul> <li> Two "pure" types: sensations & attitudes</li> <ul> <li> sensations distintinguished by their "qualitative" or "phenomenal" feel</li> <ul> <li> bodily sensations: itches, pains, etc.</li> <li> perceptual experiences: color-experiences, sound-experiences, etc.</li> </ul> <li> propositional attititudes or intentional states distinguished by their propositional contents</li> <ul> <li> propositional contents are what the sentences we use to ascribe the attitudes assert</li> <ul> <li> attitude: believe, doubt, wish</li> <li> content: that Engler was a good governor.</li> </ul> <li> immediate issue: do propositional attitudes have distinctive feels?</li> <li> usual suppositions</li> <ul> <li> propositional attitudes are the basic variety of intentional state</li> <ul> <li> Ponce de Leon sought the Fountain of Youth</li> <li> =? Ponce de Leon sought that he should find the Fountain of Youth</li> </ul> <li> belief and desire are foremost among the attitudes</li> <ul> <li> commonsense psychology sometimes called "belief-desire" psychology</li> <li> reflecting the centrality of belief & desire in practical reasoning or rational explanation of behavior</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Various "impure" types</li> <ul> <li> emotions</li> <ul> <li> e.g., embarrassment, annoyance, elation</li> <li> prima facie: mixed intentional-phenomenal character</li> <ul> <li> distinctive feels</li> <li> but also content: I was annoyed that Bush was elected.</li> </ul> </ul> <li> volitions: choices, decisions, intentions, etc.</li> <ul> <li> characteristically take infinitive VPs as objects</li> <li> I chose not to meet on Sunday. I decided to show a movie on Monday.</li> <li> close connection with action</li> <ul> <li> I'm trying to make this point clear -- here the attitude spills out into the world</li> <li> If I intend to do A now then I do it now (if not prevented).</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Is there a "Mark of the Mental"?</h2> <ul> <li> Proposed criteria of mentality</li> <ul> <li> Brentano said intentionality was the "mark of the mental"</li> <li> by "mark of the mental" we mean a criterion C such that M <-> C</li> <ol> <li> M -> C: C is necessary for mentality: only C-things are (or can be) mental</li> <li> C -> M: C is sufficient for mentality: all C-things are (or can be) mental</li> </ol> <li> example: if the brain does it, it's mental (Ba's approach)</li> <ol> <li> too broad (fails to suffice: some C aren't M): brains cool the blood but cooling the blood is not a mental process</li> <li> too narrow (not necessary: some M things (or could be) not C)</li> <ul> <li> would-be counterexamples</li> <ul> <li> actual: the nose, the retina, digital electronic computations?</li> <li> possibility: brainless ETs, future digital electronic computations?</li> </ul> <li> profitless trick solution</li> <ul> <li> define whatever organ produces mentality as "the brain" of that organism</li> <ul> <li> so Commander Data's positronic "brain" is a brain in the relevant sense</li> <li> and whatever organ or brainless ET uses counts as the ETs brain</li> <li> and the computer's CPU is it's brain</li> <li> etc.</li> </ul> <li> why profitless:</li> <ul> <li> the point of C (a brain process) was to enable us to identify M's (mental processes)</li> <li> but now we would identify C's (brains) on the basis of whether their processes are M (mental)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ol> <li> adequate definition must capture the essence</li> <ul> <li> must be necessary & sufficient in principle</li> <li> proof against even possibility counterexamples</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Epistemological criteria: we are aware our own mental phenomena in distinctive ways</li> <ul> <li> Initial reservation (LH): since the criterion appeals to characteristics of something external to the the phenomena themselves -- knowledge thereof -- it is a bad candidate for being essential and definitive</li> <ul> <li> if the mind is perfectly epistemically transparent</li> <li> then we want to know why -- what is it about mentality that makes it transparent</li> <li> though might still be adequately discriminatory (compare the litmus test for acidity)</li> </ul> <li> Direct (or immediate) knowledge</li> <ul> <li> expositons</li> <ul> <li> direct means not evidence based or inferential</li> <li> illustration: my awareness of the toothache pain v.</li> </ul> <ul> <ul> <li> my awareness of the tooth decay</li> <li> of the flat tire</li> <li> of your tooth ache</li> </ul> </ul> <li> possible complaint: direct access to sensible things or qualities, e.g., the white of the chalk</li> </ul> <li> Privacy or priviledged access: an assymetry between 1st & 3rd person awareness</li> <ul> <li> the whiteness of the chalk is equally directly accessible to all who can see: publically accessible</li> <li> my toothache is directly accessible only to me: privately accessable</li> </ul> <li> Infallibility and self-intimacy.</li> <ul> <li> exposition</li> <ul> <li> infallibility (can't be mistaken) [or incorrigibility (can't be overruled)]</li> <ul> <li> a property of our judgments concerning our own mental states</li> <li> if you think you're experiencing M then you are</li> <ul> <li> if you think you're experiencing pain then you are</li> <li> if you think you're seeing a white piece of chalk, you still might not be</li> </ul> </ul> <li> self-intimating (can't be uninformed)</li> <ul> <li> a property of our mental states (their openness to introspection)</li> <li> if you're experienceing M then you know it</li> <ul> <li> if you're experiencing pain then you know you're experiencing it</li> <li> if you believe Bush is President then you know you believe it</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> joint criterion: "the doctrine of the transparency of mind"</li> <ul> <li> all mental states are infallibly self-intimating</li> <li> Descartes (2nd Meditation): "nothing is better known to be than my own mind"</li> </ul> <li> objection from proprioception: some physical phenomena meet the joint criterion</li> <ul> <li> I am infallibly & self-intimatedly aware of the positions of my limbs (via proprioception)</li> <li> the position of my limbs is a physical phenomena if there ever was one</li> <li> conclusion: either</li> <ul> <li> the criterion is too weak: some nonmental phenomena are self-intimating and incorrigible</li> <li> or you will need to insist on very high standards of infallibility & self-intimation to rule this out</li> </ul> </ul> <li> objection from unconscious mentation: some mental states aren't infallibly self-intimating</li> <ul> <li> Freudian unconscious</li> <ul> <li> beliefs, wishes, etc. we have unawares: not self-intimating</li> <li> beliefs, wishes, etc. we falsely avow, e.g., the passive aggressive wish to "help"</li> </ul> <li> vagaries of emotion, belief, and desire</li> <li> epistemic uncertainties of sensation</li> <ul> <li> fallibility: pain v. cold: the "fraternity initiation" experiment</li> <li> self-intimation: the "turnpike trance" or "soldier in the heat of battle" phenomenon</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Kim's summation</li> <ul> <li> how exactly the special epistemic character of the mental is to be specified is controversial</li> <ul> <li> sensations v. attitudes: sensations seem to have a stronger claim to meet these criteria than attitudes</li> <ul> <li> fallibilty: "fraternity intiation" case: misimpression is short-lived</li> <li> intimation: "turnpike trance" case: description of the case is controversial (some deny that any sensations are being experienced when the driver is "on autopilot")</li> </ul> <li> soft criteria invite exceptions (e.g., proprioception)</li> </ul> <li> nevertheless, "the differences . . . noted . . . seem to point to a crucial qualitative difference between what is physical and an important subclass of the mental."</li> <ul> <li> "It may well be that we get our initial purchase on the concept of mentality through the core class of mental states for which special first-person authority holds,</li> <li> deriving the broader class of mental phenomena by extending and generalizing this core in various ways." (19)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Mentality as nonspatial</li> <ul> <li> Initial reservation (LH): since the characterization appeals to something mental phenomena presumably lack it's a poor candidate for an essential characterization or definition</li> <ul> <li> essential character is supposed to be something the thing has that makes it what it is</li> <li> still might be adequate for discrimination</li> </ul> <li> Recall Descartes</li> <ul> <li> dualism</li> <ol> <li> mind is thinking (& nonextended)</li> <li> matter is extended (& nonthinking)</li> </ol> <li> comment "most physicalists would reject this corollary" (19) that matter is unthinking</li> <ul> <li> stronger claim warranted: a physicalist must reject this corollary</li> <li> even for property dualist there will be thinking matter (brains)</li> </ul> <li> still nonspatiality might serve to distinguinsh the mental from the physical</li> </ul> <li> Proposal: mental qualities are those which do not entail the extension of their bearers</li> <ul> <li> elaboration</li> <ul> <li> if x is Qentails (or necessitates) x being extended then Q is a physical quality</li> <ul> <li> examples: color, shape, mass, etc.</li> <li> plausibly nothing could have these unless it were extended</li> </ul> <li> if x is Q does not necessitate x being extended then Q is a mental quality</li> <ul> <li> perhaps -- pace physicalism -- there are no unextended thinking things</li> <li> plausibly, there could be</li> </ul> </ul> <li> problem with abstract objects, e.g., numbers and their qualities</li> <ul> <li> consider 2 is an even prime</li> <li> plausibly numbers aren't extended</li> <li> so being even and prime are turn out to be mental qualities by the proposed criterion</li> <li> but they aren't: so the criterion fails (it's too weak, too broad)</li> </ul> <li> mental properties are those which do not entail the extension of their temporary bearers</li> <ul> <li> qualities of abstract objects belong to them eternally -- 2 is forever even, forever prime</li> <li> qualities of thought belong to their bearers temporarily: "time is the form of inner experience" (Kant)</li> <li> o.k. . . . unless there are immortal spirits with enduring mental qualities (e.g., God's wisdom)</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Kim's reservation: "one who takes this approach seriously must also take the idea of mental substance seriously"</li> <ul> <li> since "she must allow the existence of possible worlds in which menatl properties are instantiated by nonphysical beings"</li> <li> and "it makes no sense to think of abstract entities, like numbers, as subjects of mental properties"</li> <li> "the only other possibility is Cartesian mental substances"</li> <li> "Thus, anyone who accepts the criterion of the mental as the nonspatial must accept the idea of mental substance as a coherent one, an idea that makes sense." (20)</li> <li> Comment (LH): mere coherence is not that big an admission</li> <ul> <li> if you believe there could be immaterial spirits -- but there aren't -- you qualify</li> <li> many smart people have thought there were such things; perhaps they were wrong; but they weren't incoherent</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Intentionality as a Criterion of the Mental</li> <ul> <li> Intentionality characterized as a relation that does not entail the actual existence of its objects</li> <ul> <li> examples: Schlieman looked for the site of Troy and Poncé de Leon looked for the Fountain of Youth</li> <ul> <li> there is a site of Troy</li> <li> there is no Fountain of Youth</li> </ul> <li> looking for is a relation one may have to nonexistent objects (similarly believing, wanting, etc.)</li> <li> contrast finding, touching, kicking: you can't find or touch or kick what doesn't exist</li> <li> scholastic terminology intentional inexistence</li> <ul> <li> ordinary relations: both relata must actually exist for the relationship to truly hold</li> <li> intentional relations: only the subject need actually exist, the object intentionally inexists</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Brentano's thesis: intentionality is the mark of the mental (a characteristic possessed by all and only mental states)</li> <ul> <li> "Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way." (21)</li> <li> "In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on." (21)</li> </ul> <li> Subdivision of the concept of intentionality</li> <ul> <li> referential intentionality: concerns the aboutness or reference:</li> <ul> <li> the referent of my thought "There's Petey" is Pete (my cat)</li> <li> the referent of my thought "There's a cat" is Pete (my cat)</li> </ul> <li> content intentionality: concerns the sense -- something like the descriptive content -- of the expression</li> <ul> <li> "There's Petey" doesn't mean the same or have the same content as "There's a cat"</li> <li> suppose there went Louise (my other cat) instead</li> <ul> <li> my thought "There's Petey" was false.</li> <li> my thought "There's a cat" was true.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Two difficulties</li> <ol> <li> some mental states seem nonintentional (the criterion is too narrow)</li> <ul> <li> undirected or "free floating" anxiety a classic example</li> <li> more generally, "sensations like pains and tickles, do not seem to exhibit either kind of intentionality" (21)</li> <li> Bretano's "reply": when I feel pain there's</li> <ol> <li> the feeling (awareness of) it and</li> <li> there's the felt quality -- the ouchiness -- of it</li> </ol> <li> Implication & issues regarding Brentano's "reply"</li> <ul> <li> implication: the ouchiness has the same intentionally inexistent character as the Fountain of Youth</li> <li> issue: staus of inexistence is contrary to infallibility of access?</li> <ul> <li> infallibilty: if I feel pain the pain felt must actually exist.</li> <li> inexistence: if I feel it's almost time to go it needn't actually be almost time to go.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> some nonmental things are intentional</li> <ul> <li> words and sentences</li> <ul> <li> are physical objects or events:</li> <ul> <li> inscriptions of cat are physical marks (e.g., blotches of ink)</li> <li> utterances of cat are physical events (vibrations in the air)</li> </ul> <li> having sense and reference</li> <ul> <li> my utterance or inscription refers to Pete, Louise, et al.</li> <li> in virtue of its having the sense "member of the species felinus domesticus"</li> </ul> </ul> <li> two lines of reply</li> <ul> <li> distinguish intrinsic intentionality or original intentionality (as of thoughts) from derived intentionality or "as if" intentionality (as of speech, etc.)</li> <ul> <li> reply: utterances and inscriptions derive their intentionality from the intrinsically intentional thoughts that cause or accompany them & such original intentionality is the mark of the mental</li> <li> grounds for reservations</li> <ul> <li> derivation (since its external) seems a poor candidate for marking an essential distinction</li> <ul> <li> fires arising from spontaneous combustion and those lit from other fires are equally fires</li> <li> if you caught AIDS from the first person to have it you still have one and the same disease</li> <li> derived does not entail counterfeit -- quite the contrary!</li> </ul> <li> there is an account owing of the supposed derivation</li> <ul> <li> grounds to believe that (at least some of) our thoughts derive their meaning from the words we deploy in thinking them.</li> <li> and that words get their meaning from their communicative use in society</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> a more direct reply -- "bite the bullett": acknowledge that to the extent that speech acts, etc., if they do exhibit intentionality, are mental</li> <ul> <li> acknowledge "the possibility that physical systems and their states may posess genuine intentionality and hence mentality"</li> <li> the "bullet" here being physicalistic is perhaps not so hard to bite</li> <ul> <li> "After all, some would argue, we, too, are complex physical systems, and the physical/biological states of our brains are capable of referring to things and states of affairs external to them and store their representations in memory." (23)</li> <li> Perhaps too physicalistic for the taste of some: some would like to deny that computers think by asserting the counterfeit character of their derived intentionality.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ol> </ul> <li> An Unresolved Puzzle concerning the unity of the (category of) mental</li> <ul> <li> The preceding survey suggests "that our notion of the mental is far from monolithic and that it is in fact a cluster of many ideas" (23)</li> <li> some of the features cited appear independent of each other, e.g.,</li> <ul> <li> nonspatiality</li> <li> special epistemic access</li> </ul> <li> consider the two broad categories of sensory and intentional</li> <ul> <li> sensory seem paradigmatically accessible (but dubiously intentional)</li> <li> intentional states seem paridigmatically intentional (but dubiously accessible)</li> </ul> <li> Question: "In virtue of what common property are both sensory states and intentional states mental."</li> <ul> <li> purely disjunctive property intentional-or-accessible doesn't cut it (compare round-or-red)</li> <li> perhaps if we could say how they interacted we could characterize mental in terms of their interaction</li> <ul> <li> How might qualia enable cognition to have content? (Searle et al.)</li> <li> How might cognition enable qualia to be accessible? (Higher Order Theories)</li> <li> "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (Kant)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> Warning: include(/includes/insert3.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 1511 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert3.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 1511 </BODY></HTML>

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INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF MIND Warning: include(/includes/insert0.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 11 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert0.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 11 <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="shawn mikula, theory, theories, dynamic core hypothesis, consciousness resources, consciousness journals, Searle, Dennett, Edelman, brains, mind/brain, mind, brain, brain science, fmri, mri"> <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Shawn Mikula's Expansion of Consciousness Page"> Warning: include(/includes/insert1.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 24 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert1.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 24 Introduction to Theories of Mind Warning: include(/includes/insert2.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 34 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert2.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 34 Warning: include(/includes/insert_mind.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 37 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert_mind.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 37  <center> <hr width=50%><big> Introduction to Theories of Mind </big> <hr width=50%> </center> <h1> Introduction</h1> <h2> Minds as Souls: Mental Substances</h2> <ul> <li> Mind & mentality:</li> <ul> <li> a basic "natural" distinction between haves & nots</li> <li> like between living & not</li> <li> male & female</li> </ul> <li> Differences of attitude</li> <ul> <li> towards sentient things</li> <ul> <li> things possessed of sensations or feelings</li> <li> owed some measure of concern or nonabuse on that accord</li> </ul> <li> towards intelligent things</li> <ul> <li> things possessed of reasoning abilities</li> <li> owed some measure of respect on that accord</li> <li> owe some measure of respect & concern on that accord</li> </ul> </ul> <li> The higher on the scale of intelligence the more psychological characterization gets a useful grip</li> <ul> <li> sensations: pleasure, pain, itches, sensory experiences</li> <li> emotions: anger, fear, frustration, love</li> <li> perception: seeing, hearing, etc.</li> <li> memory</li> <li> learning</li> </ul> <li> Rheostat (dimmer switch) comparision</li> <ul> <li> Question 1: is there an off point?</li> <ul> <li> Question 1a: If so, where is it?</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Mental Properties, Events, and Processes</h2> <ul> <li> Minds as souls</li> <ul> <li> our very selves</li> <li> possibly immortal</li> </ul> <li> Soul as life-force, the motivating form of a living body (Aristotle)</li> <ul> <li> vegetative: plants live</li> <li> animative/sensitive: animals move and sense</li> <li> rational: humans think, exercising intelligence or reason</li> <li> incapable of disembodied existence</li> </ul> <li> Soul as immaterial intellect</li> <ul> <li> Plato</li> <ul> <li> simple, divine, and immutable (unlike bodies)</li> <li> capable of independent existence</li> <ul> <li> before birth: learning is remembrance</li> <li> as well as after: survival</li> </ul> <li> argument for the indestructibility of souls (Phaedo)</li> <ul> <li> souls are simple (not having parts)</li> <li> destruction is decomposition (coming apart)</li> <li> therefore, souls are indestructible</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Descartes: "I am, then, in the strict sense, only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason."</li> </ul> <li> Cartesian Substance Dualism</li> <ul> <li> Substance v. Attribute</li> <ul> <li> Every attribute or feature (smiling, standing, being red) is necessarily an attribute of some substantial thing (e.g., a face, a cat, a fire hydrant).</li> <ul> <li> accidents: features that the thing can either have or lack (e.g., smiling, standing)</li> <li> essences: features that the thing must have to make it the (kind of) thing it is</li> <ul> <li> e.g., for a table</li> <ul> <li> its color is an accident</li> <li> its having a top is essential</li> </ul> <li> e.g., for a person:</li> <ul> <li> accidents: smiling, standing, being tan</li> <li> essence: rationality, sensitivity, life</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Descartes: Two kinds of substances & their essences</li> <ul> <li> matter: spatial extension</li> <li> mind: thinking or consciousness</li> </ul> <li> Interaction problem</li> <ul> <li> Interactionist Dualism</li> <ul> <li> body -> body causation: the sunlight causes electro-chemical changes in my retina</li> <li> body -> mind causation: my retina goes on and I see the light</li> <li> mind -> mind causation: I see the light and think "UV radiation causes cataracts"</li> <li> mind -> body causation: I think "UV radiation causes cataracts" and reach for my sunglasses</li> </ul> <li> Trouble about mind <-> body causation: where the twain shall meet</li> <ul> <li> thoughts are in consciousness, not in space</li> <li> bodies are in space, not in consciousness</li> </ul> <li> Aggravating observation: the intimacy of the mind-body connection as we know it</li> <ul> <li> "I am not in my body like the pilot of a vessel"</li> <li> but am "intimately conjoined" with it: feeling hungry is unlike seeing the gas gauge on E</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Philosophy of Mind</h2> <ul> <li> Three issues</li> <ul> <li> What are minds or what constitutes mentality?</li> <li> How are various mental phenomena related?</li> <li> How are mental and physical phenomena related?</li> <ul> <li> How could mental phenomena have physical effects?: Causal Closure.</li> <li> Why should physical phenomena have mental effects?: Explanatory Gap.</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Additional issue: what things think (or have mentality)?</li> <ul> <li> humans</li> <li> (which) other organisms?</li> <li> computers?</li> <li> collectives?</li> </ul> </ul> <h2> Supervenience, Dependence, and Minimal Physicalism</h2> <ul> <li> Three principles</li> <ul> <li> Mind-body supervenience</li> <ul> <li> No difference without a physical difference.</li> <li> ". . . any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental properties. That is physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility." (10)</li> </ul> <li> Anti-Cartesianism</li> <ul> <li> No immaterial substances.</li> <li> "There can be no purely mental beings (for example, Cartesian souls). That is, nothing can have a mental property without having some physical property and hence without being a physical thing." (11)</li> </ul> <li> Mind-body dependence</li> <ul> <li> The physical is more basic than (and explains) the mental.</li> <li> "What mental properties a given thing has depends on, and is determined by, what physical properties it has. That is to say, the psychological character of a thing is wholly determined by its physical character." (11)</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Varieties of physicalism</li> <ul> <li> minimal physicalism</li> <ul> <li> defined by these three principles</li> <li> affirms the complete & assymetric dependence of the mental on the physical</li> </ul> <li> reductive physicalism:</li> <ul> <li> beyond superveniece & dependence: mental phenomena are physical</li> <ul> <li> pain = C-fiber activation</li> <li> visual experiences = 40hz ocillations in the visual cortex</li> </ul> <li> identifies types of mental phenomena with types of physical phenomena</li> </ul> <li> eliminative physicalism: denies the existence of the mental</li> </ul> </ul> <h2> Varieties of Mental Phenomena</h2> <ul> <li> Two "pure" types: sensations & attitudes</li> <ul> <li> sensations distintinguished by their "qualitative" or "phenomenal" feel</li> <ul> <li> bodily sensations: itches, pains, etc.</li> <li> perceptual experiences: color-experiences, sound-experiences, etc.</li> </ul> <li> propositional attititudes or intentional states distinguished by their propositional contents</li> <ul> <li> propositional contents are what the sentences we use to ascribe the attitudes assert</li> <ul> <li> attitude: believe, doubt, wish</li> <li> content: that Engler was a good governor.</li> </ul> <li> immediate issue: do propositional attitudes have distinctive feels?</li> <li> usual suppositions</li> <ul> <li> propositional attitudes are the basic variety of intentional state</li> <ul> <li> Ponce de Leon sought the Fountain of Youth</li> <li> =? Ponce de Leon sought that he should find the Fountain of Youth</li> </ul> <li> belief and desire are foremost among the attitudes</li> <ul> <li> commonsense psychology sometimes called "belief-desire" psychology</li> <li> reflecting the centrality of belief & desire in practical reasoning or rational explanation of behavior</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Various "impure" types</li> <ul> <li> emotions</li> <ul> <li> e.g., embarrassment, annoyance, elation</li> <li> prima facie: mixed intentional-phenomenal character</li> <ul> <li> distinctive feels</li> <li> but also content: I was annoyed that Bush was elected.</li> </ul> </ul> <li> volitions: choices, decisions, intentions, etc.</li> <ul> <li> characteristically take infinitive VPs as objects</li> <li> I chose not to meet on Sunday. I decided to show a movie on Monday.</li> <li> close connection with action</li> <ul> <li> I'm trying to make this point clear -- here the attitude spills out into the world</li> <li> If I intend to do A now then I do it now (if not prevented).</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> <h2> Is there a "Mark of the Mental"?</h2> <ul> <li> Proposed criteria of mentality</li> <ul> <li> Brentano said intentionality was the "mark of the mental"</li> <li> by "mark of the mental" we mean a criterion C such that M <-> C</li> <ol> <li> M -> C: C is necessary for mentality: only C-things are (or can be) mental</li> <li> C -> M: C is sufficient for mentality: all C-things are (or can be) mental</li> </ol> <li> example: if the brain does it, it's mental (Ba's approach)</li> <ol> <li> too broad (fails to suffice: some C aren't M): brains cool the blood but cooling the blood is not a mental process</li> <li> too narrow (not necessary: some M things (or could be) not C)</li> <ul> <li> would-be counterexamples</li> <ul> <li> actual: the nose, the retina, digital electronic computations?</li> <li> possibility: brainless ETs, future digital electronic computations?</li> </ul> <li> profitless trick solution</li> <ul> <li> define whatever organ produces mentality as "the brain" of that organism</li> <ul> <li> so Commander Data's positronic "brain" is a brain in the relevant sense</li> <li> and whatever organ or brainless ET uses counts as the ETs brain</li> <li> and the computer's CPU is it's brain</li> <li> etc.</li> </ul> <li> why profitless:</li> <ul> <li> the point of C (a brain process) was to enable us to identify M's (mental processes)</li> <li> but now we would identify C's (brains) on the basis of whether their processes are M (mental)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ol> <li> adequate definition must capture the essence</li> <ul> <li> must be necessary & sufficient in principle</li> <li> proof against even possibility counterexamples</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Epistemological criteria: we are aware our own mental phenomena in distinctive ways</li> <ul> <li> Initial reservation (LH): since the criterion appeals to characteristics of something external to the the phenomena themselves -- knowledge thereof -- it is a bad candidate for being essential and definitive</li> <ul> <li> if the mind is perfectly epistemically transparent</li> <li> then we want to know why -- what is it about mentality that makes it transparent</li> <li> though might still be adequately discriminatory (compare the litmus test for acidity)</li> </ul> <li> Direct (or immediate) knowledge</li> <ul> <li> expositons</li> <ul> <li> direct means not evidence based or inferential</li> <li> illustration: my awareness of the toothache pain v.</li> </ul> <ul> <ul> <li> my awareness of the tooth decay</li> <li> of the flat tire</li> <li> of your tooth ache</li> </ul> </ul> <li> possible complaint: direct access to sensible things or qualities, e.g., the white of the chalk</li> </ul> <li> Privacy or priviledged access: an assymetry between 1st & 3rd person awareness</li> <ul> <li> the whiteness of the chalk is equally directly accessible to all who can see: publically accessible</li> <li> my toothache is directly accessible only to me: privately accessable</li> </ul> <li> Infallibility and self-intimacy.</li> <ul> <li> exposition</li> <ul> <li> infallibility (can't be mistaken) [or incorrigibility (can't be overruled)]</li> <ul> <li> a property of our judgments concerning our own mental states</li> <li> if you think you're experiencing M then you are</li> <ul> <li> if you think you're experiencing pain then you are</li> <li> if you think you're seeing a white piece of chalk, you still might not be</li> </ul> </ul> <li> self-intimating (can't be uninformed)</li> <ul> <li> a property of our mental states (their openness to introspection)</li> <li> if you're experienceing M then you know it</li> <ul> <li> if you're experiencing pain then you know you're experiencing it</li> <li> if you believe Bush is President then you know you believe it</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> joint criterion: "the doctrine of the transparency of mind"</li> <ul> <li> all mental states are infallibly self-intimating</li> <li> Descartes (2nd Meditation): "nothing is better known to be than my own mind"</li> </ul> <li> objection from proprioception: some physical phenomena meet the joint criterion</li> <ul> <li> I am infallibly & self-intimatedly aware of the positions of my limbs (via proprioception)</li> <li> the position of my limbs is a physical phenomena if there ever was one</li> <li> conclusion: either</li> <ul> <li> the criterion is too weak: some nonmental phenomena are self-intimating and incorrigible</li> <li> or you will need to insist on very high standards of infallibility & self-intimation to rule this out</li> </ul> </ul> <li> objection from unconscious mentation: some mental states aren't infallibly self-intimating</li> <ul> <li> Freudian unconscious</li> <ul> <li> beliefs, wishes, etc. we have unawares: not self-intimating</li> <li> beliefs, wishes, etc. we falsely avow, e.g., the passive aggressive wish to "help"</li> </ul> <li> vagaries of emotion, belief, and desire</li> <li> epistemic uncertainties of sensation</li> <ul> <li> fallibility: pain v. cold: the "fraternity initiation" experiment</li> <li> self-intimation: the "turnpike trance" or "soldier in the heat of battle" phenomenon</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Kim's summation</li> <ul> <li> how exactly the special epistemic character of the mental is to be specified is controversial</li> <ul> <li> sensations v. attitudes: sensations seem to have a stronger claim to meet these criteria than attitudes</li> <ul> <li> fallibilty: "fraternity intiation" case: misimpression is short-lived</li> <li> intimation: "turnpike trance" case: description of the case is controversial (some deny that any sensations are being experienced when the driver is "on autopilot")</li> </ul> <li> soft criteria invite exceptions (e.g., proprioception)</li> </ul> <li> nevertheless, "the differences . . . noted . . . seem to point to a crucial qualitative difference between what is physical and an important subclass of the mental."</li> <ul> <li> "It may well be that we get our initial purchase on the concept of mentality through the core class of mental states for which special first-person authority holds,</li> <li> deriving the broader class of mental phenomena by extending and generalizing this core in various ways." (19)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Mentality as nonspatial</li> <ul> <li> Initial reservation (LH): since the characterization appeals to something mental phenomena presumably lack it's a poor candidate for an essential characterization or definition</li> <ul> <li> essential character is supposed to be something the thing has that makes it what it is</li> <li> still might be adequate for discrimination</li> </ul> <li> Recall Descartes</li> <ul> <li> dualism</li> <ol> <li> mind is thinking (& nonextended)</li> <li> matter is extended (& nonthinking)</li> </ol> <li> comment "most physicalists would reject this corollary" (19) that matter is unthinking</li> <ul> <li> stronger claim warranted: a physicalist must reject this corollary</li> <li> even for property dualist there will be thinking matter (brains)</li> </ul> <li> still nonspatiality might serve to distinguinsh the mental from the physical</li> </ul> <li> Proposal: mental qualities are those which do not entail the extension of their bearers</li> <ul> <li> elaboration</li> <ul> <li> if x is Qentails (or necessitates) x being extended then Q is a physical quality</li> <ul> <li> examples: color, shape, mass, etc.</li> <li> plausibly nothing could have these unless it were extended</li> </ul> <li> if x is Q does not necessitate x being extended then Q is a mental quality</li> <ul> <li> perhaps -- pace physicalism -- there are no unextended thinking things</li> <li> plausibly, there could be</li> </ul> </ul> <li> problem with abstract objects, e.g., numbers and their qualities</li> <ul> <li> consider 2 is an even prime</li> <li> plausibly numbers aren't extended</li> <li> so being even and prime are turn out to be mental qualities by the proposed criterion</li> <li> but they aren't: so the criterion fails (it's too weak, too broad)</li> </ul> <li> mental properties are those which do not entail the extension of their temporary bearers</li> <ul> <li> qualities of abstract objects belong to them eternally -- 2 is forever even, forever prime</li> <li> qualities of thought belong to their bearers temporarily: "time is the form of inner experience" (Kant)</li> <li> o.k. . . . unless there are immortal spirits with enduring mental qualities (e.g., God's wisdom)</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Kim's reservation: "one who takes this approach seriously must also take the idea of mental substance seriously"</li> <ul> <li> since "she must allow the existence of possible worlds in which menatl properties are instantiated by nonphysical beings"</li> <li> and "it makes no sense to think of abstract entities, like numbers, as subjects of mental properties"</li> <li> "the only other possibility is Cartesian mental substances"</li> <li> "Thus, anyone who accepts the criterion of the mental as the nonspatial must accept the idea of mental substance as a coherent one, an idea that makes sense." (20)</li> <li> Comment (LH): mere coherence is not that big an admission</li> <ul> <li> if you believe there could be immaterial spirits -- but there aren't -- you qualify</li> <li> many smart people have thought there were such things; perhaps they were wrong; but they weren't incoherent</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Intentionality as a Criterion of the Mental</li> <ul> <li> Intentionality characterized as a relation that does not entail the actual existence of its objects</li> <ul> <li> examples: Schlieman looked for the site of Troy and Poncé de Leon looked for the Fountain of Youth</li> <ul> <li> there is a site of Troy</li> <li> there is no Fountain of Youth</li> </ul> <li> looking for is a relation one may have to nonexistent objects (similarly believing, wanting, etc.)</li> <li> contrast finding, touching, kicking: you can't find or touch or kick what doesn't exist</li> <li> scholastic terminology intentional inexistence</li> <ul> <li> ordinary relations: both relata must actually exist for the relationship to truly hold</li> <li> intentional relations: only the subject need actually exist, the object intentionally inexists</li> </ul> </ul> <li> Brentano's thesis: intentionality is the mark of the mental (a characteristic possessed by all and only mental states)</li> <ul> <li> "Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way." (21)</li> <li> "In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on." (21)</li> </ul> <li> Subdivision of the concept of intentionality</li> <ul> <li> referential intentionality: concerns the aboutness or reference:</li> <ul> <li> the referent of my thought "There's Petey" is Pete (my cat)</li> <li> the referent of my thought "There's a cat" is Pete (my cat)</li> </ul> <li> content intentionality: concerns the sense -- something like the descriptive content -- of the expression</li> <ul> <li> "There's Petey" doesn't mean the same or have the same content as "There's a cat"</li> <li> suppose there went Louise (my other cat) instead</li> <ul> <li> my thought "There's Petey" was false.</li> <li> my thought "There's a cat" was true.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> Two difficulties</li> <ol> <li> some mental states seem nonintentional (the criterion is too narrow)</li> <ul> <li> undirected or "free floating" anxiety a classic example</li> <li> more generally, "sensations like pains and tickles, do not seem to exhibit either kind of intentionality" (21)</li> <li> Bretano's "reply": when I feel pain there's</li> <ol> <li> the feeling (awareness of) it and</li> <li> there's the felt quality -- the ouchiness -- of it</li> </ol> <li> Implication & issues regarding Brentano's "reply"</li> <ul> <li> implication: the ouchiness has the same intentionally inexistent character as the Fountain of Youth</li> <li> issue: staus of inexistence is contrary to infallibility of access?</li> <ul> <li> infallibilty: if I feel pain the pain felt must actually exist.</li> <li> inexistence: if I feel it's almost time to go it needn't actually be almost time to go.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> some nonmental things are intentional</li> <ul> <li> words and sentences</li> <ul> <li> are physical objects or events:</li> <ul> <li> inscriptions of cat are physical marks (e.g., blotches of ink)</li> <li> utterances of cat are physical events (vibrations in the air)</li> </ul> <li> having sense and reference</li> <ul> <li> my utterance or inscription refers to Pete, Louise, et al.</li> <li> in virtue of its having the sense "member of the species felinus domesticus"</li> </ul> </ul> <li> two lines of reply</li> <ul> <li> distinguish intrinsic intentionality or original intentionality (as of thoughts) from derived intentionality or "as if" intentionality (as of speech, etc.)</li> <ul> <li> reply: utterances and inscriptions derive their intentionality from the intrinsically intentional thoughts that cause or accompany them & such original intentionality is the mark of the mental</li> <li> grounds for reservations</li> <ul> <li> derivation (since its external) seems a poor candidate for marking an essential distinction</li> <ul> <li> fires arising from spontaneous combustion and those lit from other fires are equally fires</li> <li> if you caught AIDS from the first person to have it you still have one and the same disease</li> <li> derived does not entail counterfeit -- quite the contrary!</li> </ul> <li> there is an account owing of the supposed derivation</li> <ul> <li> grounds to believe that (at least some of) our thoughts derive their meaning from the words we deploy in thinking them.</li> <li> and that words get their meaning from their communicative use in society</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> <li> a more direct reply -- "bite the bullett": acknowledge that to the extent that speech acts, etc., if they do exhibit intentionality, are mental</li> <ul> <li> acknowledge "the possibility that physical systems and their states may posess genuine intentionality and hence mentality"</li> <li> the "bullet" here being physicalistic is perhaps not so hard to bite</li> <ul> <li> "After all, some would argue, we, too, are complex physical systems, and the physical/biological states of our brains are capable of referring to things and states of affairs external to them and store their representations in memory." (23)</li> <li> Perhaps too physicalistic for the taste of some: some would like to deny that computers think by asserting the counterfeit character of their derived intentionality.</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ol> </ul> <li> An Unresolved Puzzle concerning the unity of the (category of) mental</li> <ul> <li> The preceding survey suggests "that our notion of the mental is far from monolithic and that it is in fact a cluster of many ideas" (23)</li> <li> some of the features cited appear independent of each other, e.g.,</li> <ul> <li> nonspatiality</li> <li> special epistemic access</li> </ul> <li> consider the two broad categories of sensory and intentional</li> <ul> <li> sensory seem paradigmatically accessible (but dubiously intentional)</li> <li> intentional states seem paridigmatically intentional (but dubiously accessible)</li> </ul> <li> Question: "In virtue of what common property are both sensory states and intentional states mental."</li> <ul> <li> purely disjunctive property intentional-or-accessible doesn't cut it (compare round-or-red)</li> <li> perhaps if we could say how they interacted we could characterize mental in terms of their interaction</li> <ul> <li> How might qualia enable cognition to have content? (Searle et al.)</li> <li> How might cognition enable qualia to be accessible? (Higher Order Theories)</li> <li> "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (Kant)</li> </ul> </ul> </ul> </ul> Warning: include(/includes/insert3.txt): failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 1511 Warning: include(): Failed opening '/includes/insert3.txt' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/lib/php:/usr/local/lib/php') in /home/bmserver/public_html/mind/mind1.php on line 1511 </BODY></HTML>